Andrew Hunt Commentary

The chart below is by no means perfect in terms of its specific execution; global price indices are few and far between but it serves to make the point that, since the advent of “Globalization” during the early – mid 1990s, goods prices have lagged service sector prices by a considerable margin. Persistently positive demand versus output gaps in the West resulted in equally persistent rates of service sector and non-traded inflation, while North Asia’s output & employment maximizing pricing behaviour contained goods prices for structural reasons.

The focus in the media and amongst most analysts has centred around tariffs and a possible fiscal tightening in the USA – although we would argue that on a cash basis the latter is already happening quite aggressively. In some cases, it seems that even where the government has notionally incurred expenses, it does not seem to have distributed funds to its suppliers.

Despite its small size and geographic location, New Zealand has led the World in a number of fields – physics, Postwar economic theory (Bill Phillips was born in NZ), inflation targeting (amongst the first to make this a statutory target), globalization, and of course in many sports.

With their central banks bringing interest rates down from previously restrictive settings, 2024 has been the year when most of the world’s economic players have finally begun to experience an easing of monetary policy. In each instance, these reflected confidence that inflation, or perhaps more accurately inflation expectations, had reached a desired level, or were at least on a path towards it.

Very thoughtfully, my father presented me with a compendium of newspaper front pages covering all 60 of my birthdays. There were two sections, one for a “broadsheet” and one for a “tabloid”. In 1964, the front page of the broadsheet was dominated by an informed discussion about the enacting by a Labour Party Chancellor of a shock 200 b.p. rise in the UK Base Rate in order to stabilize the pound.

France’s Macron became a lame duck President this year. The Tory Party was dumped out of office at the UK general election in favour of a party of relatively inexperienced micro-focussed policymakers who have witnessed a remarkably short electoral honeymoon.

A few weeks ago, we began experimenting with the hypothesis that households – and even some governments – were starting to reassess their long-term income expectations. Years of weak productivity growth, concerns over economic efficiency, the cost of living, the climate and troublesome geopolitics are all likely weighing on confidence in the future, along with the seemingly changed outlook for interest rates.

The US and most other authorities’ reaction to the Global Pandemic was to flood the financial system with cash, principally via the act of central banks buying government bonds. The sums involved were massive, in part because the authorities understandably did not know “just how bad the crisis would be” but also because there was a need in March 2020 to ensure that some financial institutions that were “the wrong side” of the bond market did not perish.

In the days immediately following 9-11, markets understandably fretted that consumer spending would collapse as people would be too scared to go out. In fact, spending picked up – even the author’s usually frugal spending increased.

This may appear an odd question to ask given the recent slew of poor inflation data points that have been released but we suspect that “all is not quite as it seems” within bond markets, or even the global economy. First, the inflation story.

Major “events” in markets have been caused by wrong assumptions over mathematical relationships. The Long Term Capital Management Debacle (LTCMD) in 1998 was primarily the result of the incorrect assumption of perfect markets by a cluster of Nobel Laureates. The naïve and wrong assumptions over correlations proved to be the spectacular undoing of the mortgage markets in 2007-8.

Currently, the US economy is stuttering. Headline growth during the latter half of 2023 was extremely rapid – GDP growth averaged more than twice the economy’s 20-year average - but this strong activity was led by the public sector, either directly through government investment or indirectly via the authorities’ support for household incomes.

In my experience, there is nothing so powerful for asset markets as an “unquantifiable positive story and a tonne of liquidity”. Russell Napier’s Library of Mistakes in Edinburgh looks brilliantly at some of the madness that has taken hold of financial markets over the centuries (well worth a visit if you are ever nearby), and of course Edward Chancellor’s Devil take the Hindmost is the seminal text on the subject of credit-financed investment madness, but I have seen my fair share of mad booms firsthand.

Whether for year-end management reasons, or as a result of political considerations, it is a fact that the US Federal Reserve has allowed effective monetary conditions to ease over the last month. The public sector has injected more than $200 billion of liquidity into the financial system. It therefore comes as no surprise that financial markets are booming, yields are tumbling and the dollar is weak, a situation that we expect to continue into year end.

It has been a wild few weeks within debt markets – sharp sell-offs, even sharper rallies, and then a renewed sell off. Movements in equity markets have looked tame by comparison. Bond markets are certainly having to process a lot of conflicting information – inflation, deflation, politics and a mountain of potential issuance next year following what was an amazingly quiet year for debt issuance in 2023.

Over the recent years, there has been a tendency amongst politicians and the media to target the CPI rather than inflation itself, or at least the inflation process. Too often have we heard from policymakers that inflation can be brought down through direct government subsidies or price controls. Subsidies may well have a justifiable social purpose, particularly during times of externalities such as wars but they have no role in controlling inflation. We have even heard that interest rates should not be increased “because they affect mortgage rates and mortgage costs are in the CPI”.

The media is abuzz with stories about the demise of the US Dollar as a reserve currency and the rise of alternatives, such as the proposed new “BRICs” currency. From our perspective, we cannot think of a worse monetary idea than a pan-BRIC currency. It is difficult to conceive a less optimal currency area i.e. one worse than the Euro Area, which has certainly had (and continues to have) its problems.

There was quite simply nothing not to like about the latest US consumer price index data; not only was the headline a good number but so too were most of the internals.

One cannot turn on a financial news programme at present without hearing some talking-head or other discussing the outlook for interest rates, almost as though they are the only thing that matters to markets or the economy. We suspect that the matter to a degree to the latter, and much less to the former than is generally accepted.

As an undergraduate economist, the subject of foreign exchange reserves and reserve currencies garnered scant attention because we were in a world of floating currencies in which FX intervention, when it did occur, was only ever modest and temporary. It was only in the mid-1980s, when a number of overtly mercantilist economies in Asia began linking their (frequently undervalued) currencies to the USD and acquiring specie that global reserves became a “topic”. During the 1990s, New Zealand operated without reserves.