Evolving Markets

A few weeks ago, we began experimenting with the hypothesis that households – and even some governments – were starting to reassess their long-term income expectations. Years of weak productivity growth, concerns over economic efficiency, the cost of living, the climate and troublesome geopolitics are all likely weighing on confidence in the future, along with the seemingly changed outlook for interest rates.

The US and most other authorities’ reaction to the Global Pandemic was to flood the financial system with cash, principally via the act of central banks buying government bonds. The sums involved were massive, in part because the authorities understandably did not know “just how bad the crisis would be” but also because there was a need in March 2020 to ensure that some financial institutions that were “the wrong side” of the bond market did not perish.

In the days immediately following 9-11, markets understandably fretted that consumer spending would collapse as people would be too scared to go out. In fact, spending picked up – even the author’s usually frugal spending increased.

This may appear an odd question to ask given the recent slew of poor inflation data points that have been released but we suspect that “all is not quite as it seems” within bond markets, or even the global economy. First, the inflation story.

Major “events” in markets have been caused by wrong assumptions over mathematical relationships. The Long Term Capital Management Debacle (LTCMD) in 1998 was primarily the result of the incorrect assumption of perfect markets by a cluster of Nobel Laureates. The naïve and wrong assumptions over correlations proved to be the spectacular undoing of the mortgage markets in 2007-8.

Currently, the US economy is stuttering. Headline growth during the latter half of 2023 was extremely rapid – GDP growth averaged more than twice the economy’s 20-year average - but this strong activity was led by the public sector, either directly through government investment or indirectly via the authorities’ support for household incomes.

In my experience, there is nothing so powerful for asset markets as an “unquantifiable positive story and a tonne of liquidity”. Russell Napier’s Library of Mistakes in Edinburgh looks brilliantly at some of the madness that has taken hold of financial markets over the centuries (well worth a visit if you are ever nearby), and of course Edward Chancellor’s Devil take the Hindmost is the seminal text on the subject of credit-financed investment madness, but I have seen my fair share of mad booms firsthand.

Much like this report in 2023, global conditions will remain unique and defy a confident overall summary; thus, here are ten predictions on some particularly noteworthy factors.

Whether for year-end management reasons, or as a result of political considerations, it is a fact that the US Federal Reserve has allowed effective monetary conditions to ease over the last month. The public sector has injected more than $200 billion of liquidity into the financial system. It therefore comes as no surprise that financial markets are booming, yields are tumbling and the dollar is weak, a situation that we expect to continue into year end.

It has been a wild few weeks within debt markets – sharp sell-offs, even sharper rallies, and then a renewed sell off. Movements in equity markets have looked tame by comparison. Bond markets are certainly having to process a lot of conflicting information – inflation, deflation, politics and a mountain of potential issuance next year following what was an amazingly quiet year for debt issuance in 2023.

Over the recent years, there has been a tendency amongst politicians and the media to target the CPI rather than inflation itself, or at least the inflation process. Too often have we heard from policymakers that inflation can be brought down through direct government subsidies or price controls. Subsidies may well have a justifiable social purpose, particularly during times of externalities such as wars but they have no role in controlling inflation. We have even heard that interest rates should not be increased “because they affect mortgage rates and mortgage costs are in the CPI”.

The media is abuzz with stories about the demise of the US Dollar as a reserve currency and the rise of alternatives, such as the proposed new “BRICs” currency. From our perspective, we cannot think of a worse monetary idea than a pan-BRIC currency. It is difficult to conceive a less optimal currency area i.e. one worse than the Euro Area, which has certainly had (and continues to have) its problems.

There was quite simply nothing not to like about the latest US consumer price index data; not only was the headline a good number but so too were most of the internals.

One cannot turn on a financial news programme at present without hearing some talking-head or other discussing the outlook for interest rates, almost as though they are the only thing that matters to markets or the economy. We suspect that the matter to a degree to the latter, and much less to the former than is generally accepted.

As an undergraduate economist, the subject of foreign exchange reserves and reserve currencies garnered scant attention because we were in a world of floating currencies in which FX intervention, when it did occur, was only ever modest and temporary. It was only in the mid-1980s, when a number of overtly mercantilist economies in Asia began linking their (frequently undervalued) currencies to the USD and acquiring specie that global reserves became a “topic”. During the 1990s, New Zealand operated without reserves.

I think that it was Henry Kissinger that once said that "academic politics is so vicious because the stakes are so low". However, when academic politics affects economic policymaking, the stakes are far from low.

Although recent headline-grabbing events within the banking system have moved the topic of a potential credit crunch centre-stage in the markets’ consciousness, the fact is that a credit crunch within the Global Financial System began a year ago, while that in the US domestic economy began late last year. More recently, Europe looks to have moved down the same path. Admittedly, the global situation did improve during December and early January, when global financial conditions eased for a variety of primarily technical reasons, but this has proved to have been only a false dawn.

Our Gravity Index for China has made only a very modest recovery so far this year.

We expect fairly rough sailing for the global economy, financial system and markets in the next two quarters, but we do not expect disasters and there should be major relief for stocks later in 2023 as central banks begin to ease policy.

A regular debate between the older and younger members of the Hunt-household revolves around whether old suspenseful Black-and-White horrors are actually more scary than vivid technicolour gore modern films. We suspect that for the Federal Reserve, what you can’t see in black and white may be the scarier concept…